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PREEMPTION & SUPPLEMENTATION
UNDER REVISED 1-103: THE ROLE
OF COMMON LAW & EQUITY
IN THE NEW U.C.C.
Sarah Howard Jenkins*
NALOGIZED as being as central to the U.C.C. as a "hub" is to
a wheel, Article 1 is an integral part of the Uniform Commercial
Code.' Called a "sleeper" article by some and "inconsequential"
by others, the provisions of Article 1 should instead be viewed as a "silent
stalker" lurking in the shadows of every transaction and as relevant to the
transaction as the applicable article.2 Although it is an extremely short
article, the revision of Article 1 is a significant undertaking; the resulting
product will impact all commercial transactions within the scope of one of
the specific articles.3 One of the Article's rules of construction is of para-
mount significance in understanding the rights and obligations of com-
mercial parties but is often overlooked. This provision, Section 1-103, has
been the focus of attention by the Revised Article 1 Drafting Committee.
Section 1-103 authorizes the supplementation of the U.C.C. provisions
with principles of both common law and equity unless those principles are
displaced.
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mittee on U.C.C. Article 1 (1996-2000); B.A., 1969 Hanover College; M.A., 1970, J.D.
1982, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank research assistants, Candi Pig-
gee Hoskins, J.D. University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law
2001, for her assistance on Part I and Lea Ann Jones, J.D. University of Arkansas at Little
Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law 2001, for her assistance on "manifest unreasona-
bleness" for Part III, and Professor M. Eugene Mullins for his comments on a prior draft of
this article.
1. MILLER & CILKE, THE ABC's OF THE U.C.C., ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
xi (1997).
2. Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uni-form Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 906, 945 (1978). Revised Section 1-102 specifi-
cally limits the application of the U.C.C. to transactions within the scope of one of the
individual substantive articles. See U.C.C. Revised § 1-102 Scope of Article (2000) [herein-
after proposed Revised Article 1 will be cited as § R 1-xxx (2000)] . "This article applies to
a transaction that is governed by any other article of the [Uniform Commercial Code]."
U.C.C. § 1-102 (2000) (brackets in original).
3. See generally James J. White, The Effect of Section 1-102(3) and 1-103 on Commer-
cial Agreements Involving U.C.C. Transactions: Should They Be Revised?, ALI-ABA
course of study, "The Emerged and Emerging New Uniform Commercial Code" (Decem-
ber 8-10, 1994) (addressing the impact of Sections 1-102(3) and 1-103 on agreements sub-ject to U.C.C. Article 5).
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U.C.C. § 1-103. Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable.
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the princi-
ples of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law rela-
tive to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. 4
Courts have taken diverging positions in construing the purpose and
function of Section 1-103 and the resulting applicability of principles of
common law and equity to a commercial transaction within the ambit of
the U.C.C. Comment 1 to Section 1-103 acknowledges the continued ap-
plicability of all supplemental bodies of law "except insofar as they are
explicitly displaced" by the Act.5 When are principles of common law
and equity displaced by the provisions of the U.C.C.? The courts are not
in agreement. What doctrinal perspective have courts followed for
resolving the question of displacement? What doctrinal perspective
should a court follow for resolving the question of displacement?
In the early drafting stages of the revision, the Drafting Committee
revised the comment to Section 1-103 to delete the "explicitly displaced"
language. 6 Removing the "explicitly displaced" language eliminated an
apparent contradiction between the goals of Section 1-102(3)7 and com-
ment 1 of Section 1-103. The goals of Section 1-102 mandate a construc-
tion of the U.C.C. provision so as to modernize commercial law; to
permit the continued expansion of the U.C.C. as commercial and indus-
trial custom, usage and agreement expand; and a construction that engen-
ders uniformity among jurisdictions rather than the continued
4. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999).
5. U.C.C. § 1-103, cmt. 1 (1999).
6. Id. Section 1-103 states:
While this section indicates the continued applicability to commercial con-
tracts of all supplemental bodies of law except insofar as they are explicitly
displaced by this Act, the principle has been stated in more detail and the
phrasing enlarged to make it clear that the "validating," as well as the "inval-
idating" causes referred to in the prior uniform statutory provisions, are in-
cluded here. "Validating" as used here in conjunction with "invalidating" is
not intended as a narrow word confined to original validation, but extends to
cover any factor which at any time or in any manner renders or helps to
render valid any right or transaction.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. U.C.C. § 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement.
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise
provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1999).
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applicability of particularized local law. On the other hand, comment 1
to Section 1-103 mandates the continued applicability of particularized
local law as reflected in the principles of common law and equity as de-
veloped by each individual jurisdiction. 8 Later, the Drafting Committee
sought to give direction on the relationship between relevant supplemen-
tal law and the provisions of the U.C.C.9
What further revision beyond the elimination of the "explicitly dis-
placed" language should the Drafting Committee make in Section 1-103?
Moreover, should the Drafting Committee go to the extreme of eliminat-
ing the section? Grant Gilmore distinguished a statute from a "true
code" or civil law code by the preemptive effect of a code. 10
A 'statute'. . . is a legislative enactment which goes as far as it goes
and no further .... [W]hen a case arises which is not within the
precise statutory language, which reveals a gap in the statutory
scheme or a situation not foreseen by the draftsmen (even though
the situation is within the general area covered by the statute), then
the court should put the statute out of mind and reason its way to
decision according to the basic principles of the common law. A
'code'.. . pre-empts the field and.., is assumed to carry within it the
answers to all possible questions .... [W]hen a court comes to a gap
or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to find, by extrapolation and
analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the codifying law
.... When a 'statute'.. . has been interpreted in a series of judicial
opinions . . . the meaning of the statute must now be sought not
merely in the statutory text but in the statute plus the cases ... de-
cided under it. A 'code,' on the other hand, remains at all times its
own best evidence of what it means: cases decided under it may be
interesting, persuasive, cogent, but each new case must be referred
for decision to the undefiled code text. 11
8. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2)(a)-(b) (1999).
9. The Reporter's Notes, which will become the official comments, state in pertinent
part:
The language of subsection (b) is intended to reflect both the concept of
supplementation and the concept of preemption. Some courts, however,
have had difficulty in applying the identical language of current Section 1-103
to determine when other law appropriately may be applied to supplement
the Code, and when that law has been displaced by the Code. Some deci-
sions have applied other law in situations in which that application, while not
inconsistent with the text of any particular provision of the Code, clearly was
inconsistent with the underlying purposes and policies reflected in the rele-
vant Code provisions. In part, this difficulty arose from Comment 1 to cur-
rent Section 1-103, which states that "this section indicates the continued
applicability to commercial contracts of all supplemental bodies of law ex-
cept insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this Act." The "explicitly dis-
placed" language of that Comment does not accurately reflect the proper
scope of Code preemption, which extends to displacement of other law that
is inconsistent with its purposes and policies as well as its text.
U.C.C. § R 1-103, Reporter's Notes (2000).
10. Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
11. Id. at 1043 (emphasis added). But see William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial
"Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L. REV. 291, 309 (describing modern civil codes as
comprehensive when providing a systematic means to resolve the "unprovided for case"
through coordination, subordination, and gap-filling).
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Does the mere existence of Section 1-103 negate the viability of the
view that the U.C.C. is a "code" rather than a statute? Or is the U.C.C. a
hybrid, an attempt to formulate a preemptive regimen of rules and norms
for commercial transactions, accommodating our common law tradition
and injecting the conscience of the Chancellor into commercial transac-
tions through Section 1-103? Have courts construed the U.C.C. adhering
to the Gilmore process for statutory or code analysis? Resolving the is-
sue of Section 1-103's future may rest, in part, in determining the nature
or essence of the U.C.C. or what it has become in its 50 year history.
This article addresses these issues and recommends a perspective for
construing the proposed revision of Section 1-103. To support the recom-
mendations herein, this article reviews the history of Section 1-103 as
construed by selected jurisdictions; suggests a methodology to be em-
ployed by courts to achieve the stated goal and objectives for construing
the U.C.C.; and offers, as an illustration, an analysis for the continued
viability of the doctrine of unconscionability as a "validating or invalidat-
ing" device under Revised 1-103. Fundamentally, this article supports the
proposed revision of Section 1-103 and applauds the philosophical and
doctrinal perspective adopted by the Drafting Committee in its revision. 12
Although no change in language occurs, coupling Sections 1-102 and 1-
103 by physically combining the contents of both sections "reflect[s] both
the concept of supplementation and the concept of preemption."'1 3 No
longer will Sections 1-102 and 1-103 stand as separate legislative man-
dates of equal weight and significance, but rather supplementation of the
U.C.C. with common law and equitable principles becomes one of several
policy goals that must be balanced by the courts. This is both evolution-
ary and revolutionary. Evolutionary because the respect, acceptance, and
prominence achieved by the U.C.C. in derogation of local, parochial com-
mon law authority has been accomplished over time. Revolutionary...
perhaps the revolution occurred when Karl Llewellyn and his team set
into motion the codification of an orderly, authoritative, comprehensive
expression of commercial law. Only now is the revolution being pro-
claimed in the revision of Section 1-103. Such a clear pronouncement of
12. U.C.C. § 1-103:
Construction of Act to Promote Its Purposes And Policies; Applicability of
Supplemental Principles of Law.
(a) [The Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally construed and ap-
plied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and
(3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
(b) Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commer-
cial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
U.C.C. § R 1-103 (2000) (brackets in original).
13. U.C.C. § R 1-103, Reporter's Notes (2000).
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the preemptive goals of the U.C.C. may have been untenable in the
1950s, but now reflects the deference accorded and pervasive acceptance
of the Uniform Commercial Code and its underlying policies and pur-
poses by both the legal and business communities.
I. APPLICABILITY OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY
UNDER THE U.C.C.
The terms of Section 1-103 mandate the application of principles of
common law and equity as supplementary law to commercial transactions
unless "the particular provisions" of the U.C.C. displace them. Comment
1 goes even further by insisting that all supplemental bodies of law con-
tinue to be applicable to transactions within the scope of the U.C.C. un-
less the supplemental law is "explicitly displaced."
Courts have wrestled with the coordination of supplemental law and
U.C.C. provisions in over 600 cases14 between 196415 and 1999.16 In so
doing, they have employed a number of approaches in construing the
purpose and function of Section 1-103 and in determining the applicabil-
ity of principles of common law and equity. Of these 600 cases, the issues
most often raised were whether provisions of the Code were supple-
mented by: (1) the doctrines of waiver and estoppel;17 (2) common law
14. The ABA Subcommittee on Relation to Other Law and Scope, chaired by Mere-
dith Jackson, produced a chart of the substantive issues addressed and the resolution of the
issue under Section 1-103. A copy may be obtained by contacting Ms. Jackson at (310)
203-7953 or mjackson@irell.com.
15. French Lumber Co. v. Commercial Realty & Fin. Co., 195 N.E.2d 507 (Mass. 1964)
(supplementing Article 9 with the equitable doctrine of subrogation).
16. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Allite, 724 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 2000).
17. In forty-four cases, the supplemental doctrines of waiver and estoppel (twenty-
seven cases raised equitable estoppel and eleven promissory estoppel, one raised both eq-
uitable and promissory estoppel) were addressed by courts. For cases raising the issue of
supplementation by principles of waiver and estoppel, see First Bank of OKarche v. Lepak,
961 P.2d 194 (Okla. 1998). See also Banco Gen. Runinahui, S.A. v. Citibank Int'l, 97 F.3d
480 (11th Cir. 1996); Hurwitz v. Bocian, 670 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Logan &
Kanawha Coal Co. v. Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur, 1996 WL 551718
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wayman v. Amoco Oil Co., 923 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Kan. 1996); In re
Mycro-Tek, Inc., 191 B.R. 188 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996); Suburban Trust & Sav. Bank v. Univ.
of Delaware, 910 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1995); Nat'l Metal Finishings Corp. v. LaSalle
Nat'l Bank, 1995 WL 609312 (N.D. I11. 1995); First State Bank v. Diamond Plastics Corp.,
891 P.2d 1262 (Okla. 1995); Soc'y Nat'l Bank v. Sec. Fed. S. & L., 71 Ohio St.3d 321 (Ohio
1994); Moe v. John Deere Co., 516 N.W.2d 332 (S.D. I11. 1994); In re Edgerton, 186 B.R.
143 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Norwest Bank, N.A., 529 N.W.2d
449 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Fleet Bank, N.A. v. Polites, 1992 WL 77323 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1992); Starry Const. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1992); Bank
One, Cleveland, N.A. v. Grantham, Inc., 1991 WL 206733 (Ohio App. 1991); Mulberry-
Fairplains Water Ass'n v. Town of North Wilkesboro, 105 N.C. App. 258 (1992); Thorn-
bury v. Morris Oil Co. 846 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1993); United Nat'l Bank of Parkersburg,
W. Va. v. Norton Mach. Co., 81 Ohio App. 3d 101 (1991); Columbus Trade Exch., Inc. v,
AMCA Int'l Corp., 763 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Canadian Commercial Bank v.
Ascher Findley Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1139 (1991); Walker v. Grant County Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 304 Ark. 571 (1991); SOS Oil Corp. v. Norstar Bank of Long Island, 76 N.Y.2d 561
(1990); Zurn Constructors, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 746 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Kan. 1990);
First S. Ins. Co. v. Ocean State Bank, 562 So.2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Daniel v.
Stevens, 183 W.Va. 95 (1990); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Curley, 753 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.
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conversion for instruments under Article 3, Section 3-419;18 (3) the reme-
dial right of restitution based on unjust enrichment; 19 and (4) the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction upon tender of a check in full satisfaction.20 Of
these four major areas, recent revisions of the Code resolve the question
of the continued applicability of three of these supplementary principles,
thereby substantially reducing potential litigation under Section 1-103
based on this history.21
A. MODERN PATrERNS OF CONSTRUCTION
Several patterns of construction emerge from the review of a sampling
of cases addressing supplementation since 1990. Some courts 'require ex-
1990); Cent. Washington Bank v. Mendelson-Zeller, Inc., 113 Wash.2d 346 (1989); Citizens
Nat'l Bank of Madelia v. Mankato Implement, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1989); Third
Century Recycling, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 704 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Affiliated
Foods, Inc. v. McGinley, 426 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); In re State Street Auto
Sales, Inc., 81 B.R. 215 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Litig.,
668 F. Supp. 115 (D. Conn. 1987).
18. Twenty of twenty-eight cases addressing the displacement of common law conver-
sion were raised in the context of Article 3. See Glazer v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 930 S.W.2d
546 (Tenn. 1996); Miller-Rogaska, Inc. v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., 931 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1996, no writ); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, N.A., 341 Md.
408 (1996); In re Ostrom-Martin, Inc., 188 B.R. 245 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1995); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Cavallo, 1995 WL 594203 (N.Y. 1995); Leaksealers, Inc. v. Conn. Nat'l Bank,
1995 WL 384611 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995); Kenerson v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 889 F.
Supp. 523 (N.H. 1995); Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W. 2d 831 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994); Palmer Mfg. & Supply, Inc. v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank, 93 Ohio App. 3d 17 (1994);
Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. (Pa.), 1993); Morrow v. First Interstate Bank of
Oregon, N.A., 118 Or. App. 164 (1993); Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 778
F. Supp. 1184 (Utah 1992); Berthot v. Sec. Pac. Bank of Ariz., 170 Ariz. 318 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991); Hecker v. Ravenna Bank, 237 Neb. 810 (1991); Sloempoort v. Regency Bank of Fla.,
567 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Al Sarena Mines, Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank of
Mobile, 548 So. 2d 1356 (Ala. 1989); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 73
N.Y.2d 263 (N.Y. 1989); P.M.F. Servs., Inc. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549 (N.D. Il. 1988);
Robbins v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 294 So. 2d 219 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Lund v. Chem. Bank,
675 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
19. In re Calumet Farm, Inc., 114 F.3d 1186 (6th Cir. 1997); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v.
Cent. Bank, 49 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1995); N. Am. Lighting, Inc. v. Hopkins Mfg. Corp., 37
F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Quality Processing, Inc., 9 F.3d 1360 (8th Cir. 1993);
Thigpen v. Allstate Indem. Co., 757 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Miss. 1991); In re Spring Grove
Livestock Exch., Inc., 205 B.R. 149 (Bankr. Minn. 1997); Guar. Bank & Trust v. Smith, 952
S.W.2d 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Lombardo v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 454 Pa. Super. 403
(1996); Hanna v. First Nat'l Bank of Rochester, 207 A.D.2d 181 (N.Y. 1994); Knox v. Phoe-
nix Leasing Inc., 29 Cal. App. 4th 1357 (1994); True v. Fleet Bank-NH, 138 N.H. 679
(1994); Ambassador Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ind. Nat'l Bank, 605 N.E.2d 746 (Ind. 1992); Bank
of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Sanati, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1079 (1992); Ninth Dist. Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Ed Duggan, Inc., 821 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1991); Garren v. Smith, 803 S.W.2d
184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Azalea City Motels, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank of Mobile, 551 So.2d
967 (Ala. 1989); Farmers State Bank v. Prod. Credit Ass'n of St. Cloud, 243 Kan. 87 (1988);
Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp., 197 Cal. App. 3d 638 (1988).
20. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Envtl. Liners, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Acierno v. Worth Bros. Pipeline Corp., 656 A.2d 1085 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995); Ditch Witch
Tranching Co. of Ky., Inc. v. C & S Carpentry Serv., Inc., 812 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. Ct. App.
1991); Robinson v. Garcia, 804 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. denied);
John Grier Const. Co. v. Jones Welding & Repair, Inc., 238 Va. 270 (1989); Weidensaul v.
Greenhouse Restaurant of Lawrence, Inc., 13 Kan. App. 2d 95 (1988); Hearst Corp. v.
Lauerer, Markin & Gibbs, Inc., 37 Ohio App. 3d 87 (1987).
21. See U.C.C. §§ R 3-418, 3-420, 3-311, 1-207(b) (1999).
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press language of displacement before limiting the applicability of ex-
isting common law or equitable principles.22 Some find the common law
or equitable principles displaced by the existence of Code provisions ad-
dressing the issue in question, and others find implicit displacement by
the structure of relief available under the Code. 23 In contrast, others find
displacement only if the elements of the Code remedy are identical to the
non-Code relief sought.24 At least one court viewed Code remedies as
supplemental to common law remedies, 25 requiring explicit displacement
before limiting the applicability of existing common law or equitable
principles.2 6
These recent cases establish four basic trends in the construction of
Section 1-103. The first is the broad displacement of common law and
equitable principles by the existence of a particular provision or provi-
sions within the U.C.C.,27 such as the displacement of a negligence claim
including consequential and punitive damages when sought in addition to
a claim of conversion under former Article 3, Section 3-419. Section 3-
419, a particular provision, was held to have supplanted the payee's negli-
22. Felde v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 580 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
23. See, e.g., Stepfano v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Va., 981 F. Supp. 417, 420 (E.D.
Va. 1997); Roy Supply, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 312 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
24. See Hecker v. Ravenna Bank, 468 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Neb. 1991).
25. For dicta reflecting this view, see First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A. v. Wilkerson,
876 P.2d 326, 334 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
26. Felde v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 580 N.E.2d 191, 198 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
27. Stepfano, 981 F. Supp. at 421 (Co-payee brought action against bank for conver-
sion of checks under Revised Section 3-420 and common law negligence). If a Code provi-
sion applies to the facts of the case, the common law is displaced. The court construed the
broad statement of the general applicability of common law conversion in Section 3-420 as
limited to those claims of conversion of a negotiable instrument not specifically covered by
Section 3-420. See also Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Austin Bank of Chicago, 837 F.
Supp. 892, 896 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (discussing a drawer and drawee who sued a depositary
bank for negligence, breach of transfer warranties, and conversion for receiving checks for
collection without an endorsement). The code provisions need not "expressly" bar negli-
gence claims; the presence of other remedies renders the common law negligence claim
unnecessary. See also Carlisle Corp. v. Uresco Const. Materials, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 271, 275
(M.D. Pa. 1993) (featuring a manufacturer who brought a claim for payment of outstand-
ing purchase orders and a distributor that counterclaimed for breach of agreement and
sought to set-off its damages against the amount it owed). The court held that the common
law rules of set-off was unavailable, because the "Code sections 'occupy the legal field'
except insofar as they do not 'particularly' displace preexisting legal principles." Because
the Code specifically addresses set-off under Section 2-717, the common law rule of set-off
was displaced by that particular provision. See also Miller-Rogaska, Inc. v. Bank One, Tx.,
N.A., 931 S.W.2d 655, 662 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ) (featuring the payee of a
misdelivered check who sued depositary bank for conversion of the misdelivered instru-
ment). In Miller-Rogaska, Texas common law would permit one entitled to possession of
property to prevail on a claim for conversion. Because this right of recovery conflicted
with the ownership requirement of former Section 3-419, the Code provision displaced
common law conversion under these facts. "[C]ommon-law claims may only exist to the
extent they do not conflict with code provisions." Id. See also Roy Supply, Inc., v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). In Roy Supply, a corporate
customer sued the Wells Fargo Bank alleging negligent payment of forged checks. The
customer's negligence claim was displaced by the particular provisions of the Code (4-406)
that "expressly cover the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint." Id. See also Flavor-Inn, Inc.
v. NCNB Nat. Bank of S.C., 424 S.E.2d 534 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992).
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gence action and foreclosed recovery of consequential damages. Because
recovery under Section 3-419 was limited to the face amount of the in-
strument, consequential damages were not recoverable. However, no
particular provision displaced the common law rule permitting recovery
of punitive damages if the standards were met. Thus, if a Code provision
applied to the facts or granted remedial relief, the common law was
deemed displaced, even in the absence of express language of
displacement.
The second trend arises in a finding of implied displacement resulting
from the structure, purposes, and policies of the U.C.C.28 Here, the legis-
lature's intent to displace the common law rested not only upon the exis-
tence of a particular provision, but also from the entire code scheme-its
policy goals as reflected in Section 1-102 or the relevant provision, the
drafting history of the pertinent provisions, and the structure of remedial
relief available.2 9 United States National Bank of Oregon v. Boge30 iden-
tified four factors as indicators of legislative intent to displace the com-
mon law: the subject matter and completeness of the relevant Code
terms; the structure of the Code; whether the purposes of the Code delin-
eated in Section 1-102 were furthered by displacement; and the drafting
history of the pertinent provisions of the U.C.C. Unless this analysis es-
tablished a logical gap in the U.C.C., the asserted relevant supplemental
law was deemed displaced. Concomitantly, if the analysis revealed a logi-
28. First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A. v. Wilkerson, 876 P.2d 326, 329 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994) (featuring a customer who appealed the court's application of the subjective
standard of good faith to the bank's creation of an overdraft by paying a check drawn by
joint account holder). Following U.S. Nat. Bank of Or. v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082 (Or. 1991),
the court held the common law duty of good faith was displaced by Section 1-201(19). See
Berthot v. Sec. Pac. Bank of Az., 823 P.2d 1326,1330-31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing a
payee of two checks who brought an action alleging negligence and breach of contract
against payor bank for wrongfully paying proceeds of checks to payee's father based upon
forged endorsements). The overlapping nature of the common law and U.C.C. theory and
the overlapping nature of the claims and conflicting burdens of proving elements of "due
care" justify finding of displacement. (Note: The court defined reasonable commercial
standard as equivalent with due care. If the issue of displacement were litigated under
Revised Article 3, the clear distinction between reasonable commercial standard of fair
dealing and ordinary care would obviate one basis for the courts conclusion and the ques-
tion of displacement might have been resolved differently, given this court's analysis.) See
also Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co. v. Frosh, 494 N.W.2d 347, 353 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992). In
Trinidad Bean, the buyer brought an action against the seller for breach of contract and
appealed the court's instructing the jury on mitigation of damages under Section 2-713.
After construing "learned of the breach," in the context of anticipatory repudiation, to
mean "learned of the repudiation," the court found that the policies of Section 2-713 were
inconsistent with the defense of mitigation of damages. Buyer's damages were to be mea-
sured on the date of repudiation and if covering on that date was commercially unreasona-
ble, buyer had, under Code policy, a reasonable time to cover thereafter. See also U.S.
Nat. Bank of Or. v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1087-9 (Or. 1991). In Boge, the bank sued to
recover on promissory notes. Borrower counterclaimed that bank breached its duty to act
in good faith. Jury awarded damages to both. Bank appealed and argued that the common
law duty of good faith as the trial court instructed the jury did not apply to transactions
governed by Article 9.
29. See, e.g., Boge, 814 P.2d 1082 (Or. 1991) (identifying four indicators of legislative
intent to displace the common law under Section 1-103).
30. Id.
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cal gap in the U.C.C., then supplementation was warranted, as the com-
mon law or equitable principle had not been displaced.31 Likewise, the
circumstances, competing policies, or the nature of the relief sought also
justified supplementation in other cases. 32
At the other end of the spectrum, several courts required express lan-
guage in the Code displacing the common law rule or equitable princi-
ple 33 before prohibiting supplementation. Finally, at least one court
31. In re Advance Insulation & Supply, Inc., 176 B.R. 390, 399 (D. Md. 1994). Secured
creditor sued Chapter 7 trustee for turnover of funds held by trustee and for declaratory
judgment that creditor held perfected, first priority security interest in funds generated
from pre-petition bulk sales. The court held that enactment of Article 9 of Uniform Com-
mercial Code has not displaced common law doctrine of subrogation. Citing Finance Co.
of America v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 353 A.2d 249 (Md. 1976), the court
stated: "Nothing in the provisions of Title 9 regarding secured transactions expressly or
implicitly refutes the application of subrogation; in fact, Section 9-102 implicitly recognizes
the continued vitality of the doctrine." See also First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A. v. Wil-
kerson, 876 P.2d 326 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). In Wilkerson, buyer sued seller's bank for tor-
tious interference with seller's obligation to deliver goods that had not been identified to
the contract. The terms of Section 2-722, the scope of the section, and the purpose and
goals of the provision indicate that "common law tort of interference with contract was not
entirely preempted by U.C.C. § 2-722." The court also stated, "In the absence of a clear
legislative intent to preempt, U.C.C. remedies merely supplement common" law remedies.
32. Ed Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 252, 267
(1st Cir. 1997). In Ed Peters, a sales agent appealed dismissal of his successor liability claim
after a foreclosure sale of debtor's assets. Distinguishing the discharge of a lien from the
discharge of the underlying obligation, the court of appeals determined that the nature of
the foreclosure process could not preempt the successor liability. Further, Section 9-504 of
Rhode Island's Article 9 neither explicitly nor impliedly preempted the doctrine. In G.P.
Publications, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. App. 1997),
an unsecured creditor sued the foreclosure sale purchaser of debtor's assets asserting suc-
cessor liability. Although recognizing the strong public policy favoring discharge of
subordinate claims after a U.C.C. foreclosure sale, the court held that "nothing in" Section
9-504 absolutely precluded the equitable doctrine. However, given the strong public policy
favoring discharge of subordinate claims, the court limited the standard to be applied in
determining successor liability on the theory of "mere continuation" to the traditional test.
See also First Valley Leasing, Inc. v. Goushy, 795 F. Supp. 693, 700 (N.J. 1992). Here,
equipment buyer brought an action against seller for common law fraud, breach of con-
tract, and breach of the New Jersey consumer fraud statute. Buyer was not barred from
recovering fraud damages for purely economic loss, where seller and buyer's lessee alleg-
edly conspired to defraud buyer by having seller submit an invoice for goods that it did not
own. Determining that the dispute was not "essentially contractual in nature," the district
court opined that the New Jersey Supreme Court would permit buyer to pursue its claims
for tort damage. (The court did not address Section 2-721 in its analysis.) Similarly, in
D'Angelo v. Miller Yacht Sales, 619 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993), the court held the
buyer's recovery for economic loss was limited to Code remedies, but Section 1-103 saved
common law fraud and Consumer Fraud Act claims arising from the transaction.
33. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Envtl. Liners, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 791, 796-97 (E.D.
Pa. 1994). Debtor tendered a check in full satisfaction of a disputed claim; creditor negoti-
ated the check and sued for the difference asserting Section 1-207 displaced the common
law principles of accord and satisfaction. First, the court concluded that the scope of the
terms of Section 1-207 were inapplicable to accord and satisfaction and that the purpose of
Section 1-207 would not be furthered by its application. Second, the court predicted that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude under Section 1-103 that the common
law doctrine was retained "where not expressly superseded" with language in the statute or
comments. See also Acierno v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline Corp., 656 A.2d 1085, 1092 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1995) (discussing the effect of full satisfaction check under Section 1-207). The
court relied on commentary which stated that Section 1-207 could not be read to displace
common law accord and satisfaction given the express language of the text. See also Felde
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adopted a narrow approach to displacement. Here, unless the relevant
Code provision occupies the field by its terms, all relevant common law
and equity supplements. 34 Construing the relevant Code provision that
expressly addressed the remedial right sought by the litigant and review-
ing examples of ways an instrument might be converted, the court adopt-
ing the narrow view of displacement held that the elements of tortious
conversion of a negotiable instrument were not included, and the relevant
provision did not displace the common law principle. 35
B. ORIGINAL DRAFTERS' INTENT
Despite the varying approaches taken by the courts, drafting history
strongly suggests that Section 1-103 was included for a purpose broader
than mere deference to our common law tradition. Rather, the inclusion
of the general non-statutory law available under Section 1-103 operates
similarly to the general principles of common law,36 such as reasonable
time and reasonable manner which are also a part of Article 1. 37 Like
these general principles, the supplementary principles provide a mecha-
nism for avoiding obsolescence and for continuing the viability of the
U.C.C. More importantly, these principles prevent the statutory provi-
sions from "operating mechanically" 38 without considerations of justice,
fairness, or the general public order. Through the supplementary princi-
ples, norms such as unconscionability, which represent a general policy
and "permit adaptation to new conditions and judicial interpretation ex-
pressing the moral value of the community," 39 are included in the U.C.C.
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 580 N.E.2d 191, 198 (II1. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that rescission
was a proper remedy for breach of warranty, and that Section 2-714 did not contain lan-
guage precluding buyers from seeking the remedy of rescission).
34. For dicta taking a similar view that Code remedies supplement common law reme-
dies in the absence of clear legislative intent, see First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A. v. Wil-
kerson, 876 P.2d 326 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
35. Hecker v. Ravenna Bank, 468 N.W.2d 88 (Neb. 1991).
36. Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1962 ILL. L. FORUM 321, 330 (1962); Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commercial
Codification as Negotiation, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 17, 45 (1998) (finding that conceptions
of privity, fraud, and agreement, for example, are too fundamental to the fabric of the law
generally to imagine that they could remain static as transactional patterns evolve).
37. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-204, 9-504(3) (1998).
38. Kripke, supra note 36; Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 573-4 (2000).
Professor Maggs suggests the following several reasons for the nonexclusive principle as
follows: (1) Llewellyn and the other drafters perceived a tension between having general
legal rules and considering the equities of particular cases-Section 1-103 provided a solu-
tion by requiring judges to use all available law to reach just and equitable results unless
the U.C.C. specifically displaced the pre-existing background law; (2) the drafters saw the-
oretical difficulties with attempting to make the U.C.C. an exclusive body of law; and (3)
Llewellyn did not want to "corral" judges. With the existence of Section 1-103, judges
remained in a position to exercise discretion to achieve justice with the availability of com-
mon law and equitable principles. Maggs, supra at 572-77.
39. Hawkland, supra note 11, at 305. In his critique of the Code, Mitchell Franklin
asserted that the potential for analogical development of the text through purposive read-
ing-applying the purposes and policies to gaps within the Code-mandated that all con-
stituencies should have been involved in the formulation of the text and that the text
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Unlike the experience at common law, legal concepts and rules need not
be manipulated to achieve a just result. As business ethics and values
evolve and community mores change, the principles of common law and
equity generally evolve to accommodate and control the innovative busi-
ness practices, the novel modes of ordering and modifying commercial
relationships, variations in financing mechanisms, and commercial behav-
ior that deviates from established social norms. Ideally, as the principles
of common law and equity evolve, supplementation with these evolving
principles would also insure the continued expansion of the U.C.C. as
commercial practices expand through custom, usage, and the agreement
of the parties.4 0 Evolution of the concept of promissory estoppel as a
validating device for the enforcement of promises, which arises from its
roots in Judge Cardozo's opinions in De Cicco v. Schweizer41 and Alle-
gheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank,4 2 is an example of
this phenomenon.
Through Section 1-103, the drafters sought to institute the non-exclu-
sive principle. 43 The original drafters nestled or superimposed provisions
of the U.C.C. over existing principles of common law and equity.44 The
design of the U.C.C. was not as an exhaustive statement of all commercial
law with the concomitant task of addressing every potential occurrence
and every foreseeable transaction or issue and plugging every foreseeable
gap with rules.45 Courts were expected to develop the U.C.C. through
analogical development of the text-the application of the delineated
purposes and policies-as unforeseen and new circumstances and prac-
tices were confronted.4 6 As originally drafted and now as substantially
revised, the U.C.C. rejected a "true code" approach, as defined by Pro-
fessor Gilmore in the continental sense such as the French Commercial
should have been "qualified by ideas designed to defend the [general public order] of the
[various constituencies of the U.C.C.]." Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 340 (1951).
40. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1999).
41. 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917).
42. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
43. See Maggs, supra note 38; see also Kripke, supra note 36; State of New York, Law
Revision Commission, Study of Uniform Commercial Code Article 1-General Provisions
41 (discussing an analysis of Section 1-103 by Professor Carl H. Fulda).
44. State of New York, Law Revision Commission, Study of Uniform Commercial
Code-Article 1 at 41 (discussing an analysis of Section 1-103 by Professor Carl H. Fulda).
45. Summers, supra note 2, at 907. See also Hawkland, supra note 11 (discussing the
Prussian code of 28,000 sections to address every foreseeable problem).
46. Franklin, supra note 39, at 333, 340. Accord U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1999): "This
Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece
of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is
intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the
courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices." See, e.g., Oliver v.
Bledsoe, 5 Cal. App. 4th 998 (1992) (addressing the effect of the strict foreclosure on
lienholder's interest in note given as collateral for a line of credit by bank, the court deter-
mined that a deliberate gap in the Code was to be resolved by judicial rulemaking in light
of applicable statutes, precedents, principles-here, commercial reasonableness, and the
overarching policies and purposes of the Code).
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Code. 47 That is, as a self-explanatory code, where courts are obligated to
look no further than the code itself-its express terms, its purposes and
policies-for solutions to disputes.48 Although contrary authority exists,
the very existence of Section 1-103 negates this "true code" approach, as
defined by Professor Gilmore.49 Unless the application of the displace-
ment proviso preempts, common law and equitable principles supple-
ment. Each revised Article 5° and new addition 51 to the U.C.C. were
drafted subject to, and remain subject to, not only the purposes and poli-
cies articulated in Section 1-102, but also the continued viability of sup-
plementary principles of common law and equity that are not displaced.52
Early judicial hostility to derogating the common law,53 such as the
courts' continued reliance on common law devices or analysis that imple-
mented common law policy or values,54 as well as the absence of explicit
guidance on coordinating the mandates of Section 1-102 and Section 1-
103, led to non-uniform construction of the displacement proviso. Some
commentators suggest "that the objectives articulated in Section 1-102
tend toward vacuity and self-contradiction. '55 Rather than being vacu-
ous, these objectives or goals are pregnant with significance, adding com-
plexity to any construction of the U.C.C. or its provisions. Implementing
the goals of Section 1-102 has been a driving concern of some jurisdic-
tions. To achieve uniformity with sister jurisdictions, some have deviated
from their own precedent. 56 The guidance lacking will now be available
in Revised Section 1-103 and its Reporter's Notes.57
47. Kripke, supra note 36; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 311 (1985) (distinguishing the French Commercial Code and the U.C.C.).
48. Robert A. Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: U.C.C. Section
1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 655, 657 (1977).
49. But see Hawkland, supra note 11, at 299-300 (postulating that the U.C.C. satisfies
the systematic considerations of a true code).
50. Between 1990 and 1999, Articles 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9 were revised.
51. Articles 2A and 4A were promulgated in 1987 and 1989, respectively. "The Act
should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of
each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in
question, as also of the Act as a whole." U.C.C. § 1-102, cmt. 1 (1999) (emphasis added).
52. See generally Summers, supra note 2 at 908. Professor Summers comments that
Section 1-103 imposes a duty on judges to interpret and construe the Code to take account
of equities in the particular case unless the principles are displaced.
53. John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking A Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 341, 347 (1988).
54. Id.
55. Alces & Frisch, supra note 36, at 24.
56. See, e.g., Oswald Mach. & Equip., Inc. v. Yip, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992); Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp., 242 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); First
State Bank v. Diamond Plastics Corp., 891 P.2d 1262 (Okla. 1995); Robinson v. Garcia, 804
S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
57. The Reporter's Notes will become the Official Comments to the revised section.
November 1999 (ALl Council Draft), Prefatory Note:
This draft contains relatively detailed Reporter's Notes for those sections
that differ in substance from current law. Those Notes will be the basis for
Official Comments for those sections. With respect to the sections that have
been left substantively unchanged, it is likely that in most cases the Official
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II. PREEMPTION & SUPPLEMENTATION: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.C.C.
AND OTHER LAW
Stating the contrary position to that taken in current comment 1 of
Section 1-103, the revised comment proclaims, "unless a specific provi-
sion of the Code provides otherwise," other law does not supplant the
provisions of the Code, "including the purposes and policies [that the]
provisions reflect. ' 58 Thus, Revised Article 1, as drafted November 2000,
delineates and redefines for some the interrelationship between the
U.C.C. and the supplemental principles of common law and equity. Pri-
macy is given to purposive interpretation-the liberal construction of the
Code's provisions to promote its underlying purposes and policies.59 The
U.C.C. is declared to be the "primary source of commercial law."' 60 The
paramount rule of construction is that of preemption. This preemptive
role extends to the displacement of any law that is inconsistent not only
with its express terms but also its purposes and polices. Going beyond a
statement of the preemptive role of the Code, the Drafting Committee
addresses a recurring concern of commentators-the absence of a "stan-
dard or uniform methodology for both interpreting and applying the
Code. '61 No longer must courts struggle with the tension between sup-
plementary principles and the U.C.C. provisions.62 Placement of current
Section 1-103 within current Section 1-102 supports a conclusion that sup-
plementation by other law no longer stands on an equal footing with the
purposes and policies delineated in Section 1-102, but rather, continued
viability of supplemental law is now one of several policy goals that must
be balanced rather than separately accommodated. The current Re-
porter's Notes delineate the methodology for construing the comprehen-
sive, integrated Code that is superimposed upon the supplementary
principles of common law and equity of the jurisdiction. These supple-
mentary principles are considered secondarily.63
A. EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE U.C.C. ADDRESSES THE ISSUE
Adhering to the guidance provided, a court confronted with an as-
serted unforeseen issue or context must ascertain, by reviewing the rele-
Comments ultimately will consist of an updated version of the current Offi-
cial Comments.
58. U.C.C. § 1-103, Changes from Current Law, cmt. (b) (ALI Council Draft 1999).
59. U.C.C. § R 1-103(a) (2000).
60. Id., Reporter's Notes, cmt. b.
61. Gedid, supra note 54, at 341.
62. In Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp., 242 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988), the court was confronted with a conflict between Section 1-102(1) and (2) and Sec-
tion 1-103 supplementation by equitable principles. Without resolving the conflict directly,
supplementation was permitted.
63. Although not consistent with strict construction under current Sections 1-102 and
1-103, this method of construction was recommended by Professor Hillman in his article
Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: U.C.C. Section 1-103 and "Code" Method-
ology, supra note 48.
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vant article, whether the express language addresses the issue raised for
resolution. If so, the express language is not supplanted by consistent or
inconsistent supplementary law. The text governs; supplementation is un-
warranted. Resorting to supplementary principles would be impermissi-
ble unless some broader, general public policy or fundamental value
necessitates policing the transaction or adjusting the equities between the
parties. For example, in In re Hoover,64 lessor sought to recover a por-
tion of the proceeds from the sale of crops planted by the debtor on the
leased land. The debtor vacated the premises after planting the crop and
without paying the final installment due for the rent. Thereafter, the
debtor granted a security interest in the growing crop to two separate
creditors. Each creditor perfected its security interest in the growing
crops. Applying the provisions of Article 9 to the lessor's application for
compensation for use of her land, the court found that the U.C.C. applied
to the facts and governed the rights in the proceeds of the personalty, the
crops. However, the court held that the general equitable principles of
restitution supplemented Article 9 and ordered compensation of the les-
sor for the rental value of her land for the seven months the crop matured
on her land after the expiration of the debtor's lease. Here, the broader
community value, one of the external policies upon which the U.C.C. is
superimposed, of preventing unjust enrichment supplemented the U.C.C.
provision, preventing injustice that would have resulted from the
mechanical operation of the rules of Article 9. Lessor had subsidized the
growth of the collateral to maturity. The court ordered the compensation
of the lessor first from the proceeds then the secured parties in the order
of their priority.65
64. 35 B.R. 432 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
65. Id. at 438. See also City Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 4343 So.2d 1299 (La. Ct. App.
1983). In City Bank & Trust Co. v. White, the corporation's president signed a note on
behalf of the corporation without showing representative capacity and indorsed the reverse
side of the note in blank. When sued in his personal capacity as maker of the note, the
court held that as between immediate parties, the president should not be held liable on
the maker contract. This holding is consistent with the express language of the text. As to
his liability as an accommodation indorser or surety, the president raised the corporation's
defense of lack of consideration for the corporation's promise to pay. The corporation did
not receive the proceeds of the note. As a surety, the president was entitled to assert this
defense. Again, the express language of the provisions of the U.C.C. governed the issues
before the court. However, after holding that neither maker nor indorser liability existed
for the president, the court applied the supplemental principles of restitution to prevent
unjust enrichment and required the president to disgorge the benefit received. Why? Af-
ter receiving the corporation's note, the bank mistakenly applied the proceeds of the loan
to the president's personal notes. The president had received the funds personally. Under
Revised Article 3, the president would not have been qualified to assert the accommoda-
tion-party status because he received a direct benefit from the proceeds and liability would
be imposed on the basis of the indorser contract. Assuming some reasoned justification for
the court's finding of accommodation party status, applying the supplemental principles of
restitution is a proper outcome.
[Vol. 54
2001] COMMON LAW AND EQUITY IN THE NEW U.C.C. 509
B. A GAP IN THE U.C.C.-THE UNFORESEEN ISSUE OR CONTEXT
If the text does not address the issue or context raised-if the U.C.C. is
silent on the issue or if the transaction in which the issue is raised is a new
type of transaction-then, because the text does not address the issue or
the type of transaction, the court must determine whether an analogy ex-
ists within the U.C.C. Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics66 and
Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.67 both presented new types of trans-
actions-the long term lease of goods for the useful life of the goods and
the licensing of software, respectively. In both instances, Article 2 pro-
vided an analogous context for resolving the issues. Barclays Bank
D.C.O. v. Mercantile National Bank68 illustrates the concern where an
issue not within the express language of the text was addressed.69 Here,
Mercantile Bank asserted it was not subject to liability as a confirming
bank because the issuer of a letter of credit was not a bank. The express
language of former Article 5 defined a confirming bank as "a bank which
engages to honor a credit... issued by another bank." The court rejected
this argument finding that the underlying policies of the Code and Article
5 justified confirmation of non-bank credits. 70 In each of these instances,
an extension of the U.C.C. to accommodate innovative practices
resulted. 71
Before applying an article or rule, the court should ascertain whether
the purposes and policies of simplification, clarification, modernization,
predictability, and uniformity will be served by applying the U.C.C. by
analogy. Does this interpretation give due consideration to the relevant
custom and usage or the agreement of the parties even when an expan-
sion of law results, thereby implementing the U.C.C. policy of "per-
mit[ting] the continued expansion of commercial practices"? 72 Is the
construction consistent with that of sister jurisdictions that have resolved
the issue? Is the resolution by sister jurisdictions consistent with the un-
derlying purposes and policies of the U.C.C., or mere adoption of their
own legal or equitable precedent? 73 Resolving these questions will assist
66. 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984).
67. 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
68. 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. See Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 843-46 (1978) (featur-
ing an in-depth analysis of Barclay).
70. Id. at 845.
71. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1999).
Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement.
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes and policies.
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage and agreement of the parties.
Id. at § 1-102(1)(b).
72. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1999).
73. See, e.g., Oswald Mach. & Equip., Inc. v. Yip, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
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the court in fulfilling the goals of construing the U.C.C. in keeping with
its purposes and policies.
However, the inquiry must not end here. Consideration must be given
to the policies and purposes of the article and the provision that may be
applied by analogy. Are these policies and purposes advanced through
the resolution of the issue? Is this resolution consistent with the purposes
and policies underlying the relevant article? Does the resolution imple-
ment the important policy goals of the relevant article,74 or does the con-
struction contradict or conflict with the loss allocation or remedial
scheme of the article? 75 Is the construction consistent with the policies
and purposes of the relevant provision in question? If so, the gap-the
unforeseen issue or context-should be resolved by analogical develop-
ment or extension of the U.C.C. Supplementation by local law is unnec-
essary; the asserted relevant common law or equitable principle is
displaced by the particular provisions of Section 1-102, the purposes and
policies of the U.C.C., and the specific provision applied by analogy.
C. WHEN THE U.C.C. IS UNCLEAR OR AMBIGUOUS
Assume, however, that the U.C.C. is unclear or ambiguous on an issue
such as the continued viability of other rules or remedies. United States
National Bank of Oregon v. Boge76 and Stone & Webster Engineering
Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Greenfield77 are examples of
this conundrum. In the former, the issue was the continued viability of
the common law rule of good faith in a secured transaction, and the latter
focused on the drawer's right to bring an action in conversion under for-
mer Article 3-419. 78 In both cases, the fundamental issue was the dis-
placement of other law. Had the right to assert conversion beyond that
defined in former Article 3 been displaced? Must a party satisfy both the
U.C.C. standard of good faith and the common law standard? Again, the
beginning point is the particular provision of Section 1-102, such as the
purposes and policies of the Code; the purposes and policies of the rele-
vant article; and the purposes and policies of the applicable section.
To resolve the issue a court must ask: will supplementation by a partic-
ular local rule adversely affect the simplification, clarification, moderniza-
tion, predictability, and uniformity of commercial law? Will the scheme
of the article-its risk allocation, its notice obligations, its imposed duties,
or its remedial rights be impaired by supplementation? Will the policy
74. See, e.g., Stenseth v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995)
75. Knox v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting
precedent based on equitable principles after considering scheme of the relevant article,
and resolution of the issue by sister jurisdictions).
76. 814 P.2d 1082 (Or. 1991) (holding that the common law duty of good faith was
displaced by Section 1-201(19) when confronted with the question of the continued viabil-
ity of the common law duty of good faith).
77. 184 N.E.2d 358 (Mass. 1962).
78. Under both former Article 3 and Revised Article 3, a payee who has received the
instrument is the proper plaintiff in a conversion action.
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goals of the specific provision be advanced, nullified, or impaired? Un-
less the purposes and policies of the U.C.C. are advanced, the scheme of
the relevant article implemented, and the policy goals of the specific sec-
tion are advanced by supplementation, the supplemental principle is dis-
placed. A court must resist any temptation to defer to its local rule or
principle rather than undertake the rigor of analysis.
Employing this methodology, the U.C.C. itself becomes the best source
for gap-filling, whether the gap is some new transactional context in
which the issue arises-lease or license or novel-or the gap is the ab-
sence of a substantive legal rule to be applied. Under Revised Article 1,
as currently drafted, the appropriation of common law and equity is more
restricted.79 The overarching effect of the revised section is to explicitly
provide for purposive interpretation of the Code, interpretation consis-
tent with its policies and purposes.80 Consequently, the rules of construc-
tion, including the stated goal of "liberal" rather than "literal"
construction of its provisions, statements of purpose in the text or in-
ferred from the choice of language, the official comments including the
stated "Purposes of Changes," the referenced prior uniform statutory
provisions, if any, prefatory remarks, and drafting history are valuable
sources from which to glean the underlying policies and purposes of each
provision and the article as a whole.81 Because every revised article and
each new addition to the U.C.C. were drafted subject to Article 1, this
construction methodology should be applicable to the entire U.C.C., de-
spite any inadvertent or deliberate attempt to modify the principle of pur-
posive interpretation in any earlier revision of individual articles or
promulgation of new articles. 82 Furthermore, statements by drafting
committees, while a source of purpose and policy, should not, as uncodi-
fied, non-statutory unofficial commentary, preempt the overarching con-
struction guidelines of Revised Section 1-103. Otherwise, one of the
fundamental construction guidelines in Revised Article 1, Section 1-103
of simplifying and clarifying the law governing commercial transactions
becomes meaningless. 83
79. In his 1978 article on the supplementary role of equitable principles pursuant to
Section 1-103, Professor Summers suggest that the best model for nondisplacement was
one in which the text did not address the displacement issues; the text was not comprehen-
sive and exclusive; the comments did not indicated that displacement was intended; the
specific objectives of the section were not overriding principles; and nondisplacement
would not significantly interfere with the general underlying Code objectives of uniformity,
modernization, and predictability; and Code analogies and Code history do not dictate
displacement. Summers, supra note 2, at 939 (emphasis added). The test now becomes
would not "interfere" rather than "significantly interfere" with the objectives of uniform-
ity, modernization, and predictability.
80. See generally McDonnell, supra note 69.
81. See TWINING, supra note 47, at 324.
82. See Maggs, supra note 38, at 569-70 (suggesting that commentary in Articles 4A
and 9 take a hostile view of purposive interpretation, and drafting modifications in Article
3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 eliminate stated goals and purposes of the sections and the verbose drafting
style reveal a waning enthusiasm for purposive interpretation).
83. U.C.C. § R 1-103(a)(1) (2000); U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1999).
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D. ANALOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: ITS LIMITS
With the mandate and guidance for analogical development of the
U.C.C. in Revised Section 1-103, what constraints corral the burgeoning
of the U.C.C. beyond proper boundaries? Is an analogy merely in the
eye of the beholder or does the U.C.C. contain sufficient parameters to
restrict abuses? The limits and the constrains are found in the underlying
purposes and policies of the U.C.C., as delineated in Revised Section 1-
103, the policies and purposes of the relevant article, and, when appropri-
ate, the policies and purposes of the specific provision.
Primarily, the U.C.C. should not be extended beyond "its reason. ''84
Hence, a construction or application of the U.C.C. beyond its reason, its
fundamental purpose, should not be heeded. Its scope is limited to gov-
erning commercial transactions85 but not transactions for the conveyance
of an interest in land.86 Yet, it applies by analogy "to any transaction,"
regardless of its form, that creates a lease of personal property other than
goods87 but is inapplicable to money 88 and credit or debit card slips.89
Thus, where an existing regulatory scheme provides clear rules for gov-
erning specialized transactions such as the real estate recording statutes
and that scheme will neither hinder the expansion of commercial prac-
tices nor obfuscate the goals of predictability, deference should be given
to the existing legal regime. Expansion or extension of the U.C.C. is un-
necessary. The U.C.C. was not intended to be an exhaustive statement of
all the law governing commercial transactions.
In addition to the restraints inherent in the underlying policies and pur-
poses of the U.C.C., the role of the Permanent Editorial Board is a safe-
guard against the extension of the U.C.C. beyond its proper boundaries.
In 1953, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the U.C.C. without a single
non-uniform amendment to the promulgated text.90 Shortly thereafter,
the New York Revision Commission reported its assessment of the
U.C.C. in 1956 with detailed suggestions regarding the codification ef-
fort.91 Inclusion of some mechanism for institutionalizing "'constant re-
codification"' of the U.C.C. text to avoid obsolescence was among the
recommendations. 92 Both the desire to provide a mechanism for re-codi-
84. "[T]he proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and applica-
tion be limited to its reason." U.C.C. § 1-102, cmt. 1 (1999).
85. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1999). See generally DONALD B. KING, THE NEW CONCEP-
TUALISM OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 13 n.49 (1968) (citing the drafter's refer-
ence to Agar v. Ordin, 264 N.Y.248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934), as an indicator of the extent the
underlying purposes are to be considered).
86. U.C.C. § 2-107(1) cmt. 1 (1999).
87. U.C.C. § 2A-102 cmt. (1999).
88. U.C.C. § 3-102 (1999).
89. U.C.C. § 4-104(9) cmt. 8 (1999).
90. William A. Schnader, The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code-Can it Accomplish Its Object?, 3 AM. Bus. L.J. 137 (1965).
91. Id.
92. Peter Winship, Symposium: As The World Turns: Revisiting Rudolf Schlesinger's
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code "In the Light of Comparative Law", 29 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1996).
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fication and to encourage elimination of the 522 non-uniform amend-
ments that resulted with the enactment of the U.C.C. by 30 states before
1965 led to the formation of the Permanent Editorial Board.93
The U.C.C. sponsors, the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, received an en-
dowment from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh for
the continuing functioning of the Permanent Editorial Board to induce
states to eliminate non-uniform amendments in their Code and to enact
the U.C.C. as promulgated unless to address local litigation procedure. 94
On August 5, 1961, the Permanent Editorial Board was established and it
was organized in May 1962.95
The agreement between the Code sponsors authorizes the PEB to
serve as the "watch dog" for the U.C.C. Its initial goals were
to assist in attaining and maintaining uniformity in state statutes gov-
erning commercial transactions and to this end to approve a mini-
mum number of amendments to the Code. Amendments shall be
approved and promulgated when (a) It has been shown by experi-
ence under the Code that a particular provision is unworkable or for
any other reason obviously requires amendment; or (b) Court deci-
sions have rendered the correct interpretation of a provision of the
Code doubtful and an amendment can clear up the doubt or; (c) New
commercial practices shall have rendered any provisions of the Code
obsolete or have rendered new provisions desirable. 96
Later in 1987, the scope and function of the PEB were extended to
empower the PEB to issue supplemental commentary on the U.C.C.
PEB Commentaries may be issued: (1) to resolve an ambiguity by stating
what the PEB considers to be the legal rule; (2) to state a preferred reso-
lution if judicial opinions or scholarly writings diverge; (3) to elaborate on
the application of the U.C.C. if the statute or Official Comments create
doubt as to its applicability to particular circumstances or transactions;
(4) to apply the principles of the U. C. C. to new or changed circumstances,
consistent with Section 1-102 (2)(b); (5) to clarify or elaborate on the op-
eration of the U.C.C. with other statutes and general principles of law
and equity pursuant to Section 1-103; and (6) to otherwise improve the
operation of the U.C.C. With the PEB serving as "watch dog" over the
U.C.C., a mechanism is in place to bring correction to an overly-expan-
sive reading of the U.C.C.
93. Schnader, supra note 90, at 143.
94. Id. at 139.
95. The Director of the ALl and the Chairman of the Conference Commercial Code
Committee both serve as ex officio members along with five members appointed by the
ALl and four appointed by the Conference.
96. Schnader, supra note 90, 139.
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E. ANALOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMPLE
Consider the following hypothetical context: Buyer receives a record 97
from Seller offering to sell 20,000 tons of gravel at $X.00 a ton for deliv-
ery before December of that year. Seller's letterhead appears at the top
of the communication and its authorized agent's signature, electronic or
other symbol, also appears in the record. Within the time frame speci-
fied, Buyer sends a written communication accepting without varying the
bargained-for terms of the Seller's offer. Thereafter, Seller refuses to
perform. Buyer sues to enforce the agreement between the parties.
Seller asserts the Statute of Frauds, Buyer lacks a writing signed by Seller
that is sufficient to indicate a contract for sale has been made. 98 Under
the express language of Section 2-201(1), Buyer's possession of the
Seller's signed offer might not satisfy the statutory writing require-
ments.99 Neither would the Buyer's acceptance satisfy the terms of the
exception created for confirmatory communications between
merchants. 100 Should Section 2-201 be extended analogically to recog-
nize the use of the two writings, the signed offer by the Seller and the
Buyer's acceptance? 1
Consider that Section 2-201(3)(b) permits the writing requirement of
the Statute of Frauds to be satisfied by an admission by the party against
whom enforcement is sought if the admission is made in the party's
pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court. Consistent with the goal of
liberal construction of the provisions of the U.C.C., some courts have
held that testimony establishing the requirements of formation, an offer
and an acceptance, rather than the stated admission of "I contracted with
the plaintiff" satisfies the statutory requirement. 10 2 Although the admis-
sion exception has inherent trustworthiness that is lacking with the use of
the two writings-the setting in which the admission is made, the availa-
bility of cross examination and redirect-fundamentally, however, the ev-
97. "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. U.C.C. § R
1-201(34) (November 2000 draft).
98. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1999).
99. But see CAROLINE BROWN, 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 22.8 at 745-46 (Rev. ed.
Joseph M. Perillo editor) (stating the proposition that a signed offer is a sufficient writing
to satisfy the statute of frauds).
100. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1999).
101. Authority is divided on the effect of the introduction language in Section 2-201 (1):
"Except as otherwise provided in this section." U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1999). In Lige Dickin-
son v. Union Oil, 635 P.2d 103 (Wash. 1981), the court construed the language to limit the
use of exceptions to the Statute of Frauds to those listed in subsections (2) and (3) of
Section 2-201. All other exceptions were held displaced by the above quoted language of
subsection (1). Others, however, have construed subsections (2) and (3) as definitional not
intended to "eliminate equitable and legal principles traditionally applicable in contract
actions." Warder & Lee Elevator v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1979) (citing
WHITE AND SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-6 at 59 (1972)). See also Hurwitz v. Prime Communications, 233 UCC Rep.
Serv.2d 1213 (Mass. Super. 1994).
102. Hornell Brewing Co. v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Quaney v.
Tobyne, 689 P.2d 844 (Kan. 1984).
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idence is the same, an offer and an acceptance. Furthermore, using the
two writings avoids the unfairness that occurs in those jurisdictions that
have held or intimated that the plaintiff is entitled to go to trial with the
hope of eliciting an admission. 10 3 Moreover, the signed offer and accept-
ance provide credible evidence at least as substantial as that which must
be established should a party seek to rely on the merchant's confirmatory
memorandum exception of Section 2-201(2).
The analogical extension, here, is consistent with the purposes and poli-
cies of the Statute of Frauds, that is, protecting the Seller from a false or
fraudulent claim of a contractual relationship. Furthermore, the exten-
sion is consistent with the strong countervailing policy of abrogating the
use of the Statute of Frauds as a tool for perpetrating a fraud. Ergo, the
writing in confirmation, the admission exception, as well as the specifi-
cally manufactured goods and the partial performance exceptions were
included in the statute. Each exception requires some objective source of
evidence as a basis for believing that the "oral evidence rests on a real
transaction.' 0 4 The asserted analogical extension supports and furthers
the overriding policies of Section 2-201 and implements the purposes and
policies of the U.C.C. Such an exception simplifies and modernizes the
law and increases predictability. The analogical extension should be rec-
ognized and employed.
III. VALIDATION & INVALIDATION DEVICES: THE ROLE
OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
With increased emphasis on the U.C.C. as the primary source of com-
mercial law, what role does supplemental law play in the new U.C.C.?
The inclusion of the supplemental non-statutory law through current Sec-
tion 1-103 adds breadth to the U.C.C., satisfying several significant func-
tions: (1) providing a mechanism for avoiding obsolescence and for giving
continued viability to the U.C.C.; (2) preventing the statutory provisions
from "operating mechanically"' 0 5 without considerations of justice, fair-
ness, or the general public order;106 (3) serving as tools for adapting the
U.C.C. to new conditions; and (4) facilitating "judicial interpretation ex-
103. Gooch v. Farmers Mktg. Ass'n, 519 So. 2d 1214 (Miss. 1988). But see DF Activities
Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988).
104. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (1999).
105. Kripke, supra note 36; Maggs, supra note 38. Professor Maggs suggest several rea-
sons for a nonexclusive principle:
First, Llewellyn and the other drafters perceived a tension between having
general legal rules and considering the equities of particular cases .... Sec-
tion 1-103 provided a solution by requiring judges to use all available law to
reach just and equitable results unless the U.C.C. specifically displaced the
pre-existing background law. Second, the drafters saw theoretical difficulties
with attempting to make the U.C.C. an exclusive body of law .... Third,
Llewellyn did not want to "corral" judges.
Maggs, supra note 38, at 574. With the existence of Section 1-103, judges remained in a
position to exercise discretion to achieve justice with the availability of common law and
equitable principles. Id.
106. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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pressing the moral value of the community.' 10 7 Regrettably, under the
reign of the common law, the absence of appropriate tools to adjust the
equities between parties led to judicial manipulation of core concepts,
such as offer and acceptance, or to determinations that a clause of the
contract was contrary to public policy, to prevent injustice and unfairness
because of the mechanical operation of common law rules.' 08 These ma-
nipulations were a boon for the party who had been overreached or co-
erced. But they created uncertainty and unpredictability in the
development of contract law and for those who sought to plan or antici-
pate risks associated with doing business locally or in the broader inter-
state markets. The use of supplemental principles avoids the need for
judicial manipulation. Concrete tools are now available when the proper
context arises. Doctrines of mistake, unconscionability, estoppel, ratifica-
tion and the like may be marshaled when justified by the facts of the
individual case. More importantly, the continued refinement of the arti-
cles and provisions of the U.C.C. through the revision process, with the
occasional slanting of principles without reasonable justification toward
those with substantial representation in the reform process,10 9 mandates
the availability of provisions to reaffirm or establish the mor6s and values
of the community-the ordre publique to deal with unfairness, questiona-
ble business tactics and practices, fraud, and the like.'10
Early in the process of revising Article 1, the Drafting Committee in-
cluded a provision on unconscionability in the text of the revised draft."'
Thereafter, the section and its contents were bracketed because of the
"tentative nature of the section's inclusion."'1 12 Although the provision
was bracketed, its substance was available for discussion and comment.
107. Hawkland, supra note 11, at 305. In his critique of the Code, Mitchell Franklin
asserted that the potential for analogical development of the text through purposive read-
ing-applying the purposes and policies to gaps within the Code-mandated that all con-
stituencies should have been involved in the formulation of the text and that the text
should have been "qualified by ideas designed to defend the [general public order] of the
various constituencies of the U.C.C." Franklin, supra note 39, at 340.
108. See discussion, infra at notes 137-38. See also KING, supra note 85, at 69-76.
109. See, e.g., the suretyship provisions of Revised Article 3, § 3-605 (1990).
110. See Franklin, supra note 39, at 340.
111. U.C.C. § 1-306. Unconscionable Contract or Term
(a) If a court finds as a matter of law that an agreement or any term thereof
was unconscionable at the time it was made or was induced by unconsciona-
ble conduct, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the re-
mainder of the agreement without the unconscionable term, or so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid an unconscionable result.
(b) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (a), the court, on mo-
tion of a party or its own motion, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the agreement or term thereof or
of the conduct.
U.C.C. § 1-306 (Tentative Draft April 1997).
112. [SECTION 1-306. UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR TERM.
(a) If a court finds as a matter of law that an agreement or any term thereof
was unconscionable at the time it was made [or was induced by unconsciona-
ble conduct], the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the
remainder of the agreement without the unconscionable term, or so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid an unconscionable result.
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Six months later, the provision was deleted.113 The provision is not in-
cluded in the current draft. Given this history, should a presumption
arise that the drafters no longer intend for unconscionability to be used as
a validating or invalidating device? Furthermore, given the decision to
omit a specific unconscionability provision from Revised Article 1, is the
manifestly unreasonable test, a designated tool for controlling the agreed
to terms that vary from the default rules of the U.C.C.,114 sufficient for
policing Article 1 rights? 115
A. AVAILABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A
VALIDATING OR INVALIDATING DEVICE
Absent an express directive in the text or comments to Revised 1-103,
no negative inference should arise from the exclusion of a specific uncon-
scionability provision from the final draft of Revised Article 1. The cur-
rent Reporter's Notes affirm the intent of the Drafting Committee to
leave unchanged the text of current Section 1-103. Section (b) of Revised
1-103 "is identical to [the] current Section 1-103. '' 116 The doctrine of un-
conscionability was accessible through current Section 1-103 and remains
(b) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (a), the court, on mo-
tion of a party or its own motion, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the agreement or term thereof or
of the conduct.
(c) This section does not apply to the extent that an agreement is governed by Article 5 of
this [Act]].
U.C.C. § 1-306 (Tentative Draft April 1997).
113. U.C.C. § 1-306 (ALl Council Draft 1999).
114. U.C.C. § 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement.
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be
disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if
such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1999). The revised article maintains the substance of U.C.C. § 1-102(3)
(1999).
Section 1-302. Variation by Agreement.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or elsewhere in [the Uni-
form Commercial Code], the effect of provisions of [the Uniform Commer-
cial Code] may be varied by agreement.
(b) The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by [the
Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement. The parties, by agree-
ment, may determine the standards by which the performance of those obligations is to be
measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Whenever the [Uniform
Commercial Code] requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time
which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
(c) The presence in certain provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] of the phrase
"unless otherwise agreed," or words of similar import, does not imply that the effect of
other provisions may not be varied by agreement under this section.
U.C.C. § R 1-302 (2000).
115. The policing tool of good faith is also available in its broadened scope. Good faith
under Revised Article 1 will not only require honesty in fact but also observance of reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing for all articles except Article 5. U.CC. § R 1-
201(22).
116. U.C.C. § R 1-103, Reporter's Notes, Changes from Current Law (2000).
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an available tool for judicial interpretation. 117 The decision to omit a spe-
cific unconscionability provision may have resulted from a desire to avoid
being redundant. As an invalidating device, the availability and potential
use of the judicial tool of unconscionability has a developed history in
case authority that establishes its effectiveness. 118 The underlying pur-
poses and policies of the Code, as exemplified by the inclusion of specific
unconscionability provisions in Article 2 and 2A, and the expanded defi-
nition of good faith to include fairness in dealing for all articles except
Article 5 support a conclusion that continued viability of the doctrine is
intended under Revised Section 1-103(b) to supplement the Code unless
displaced.
B. DISPLACEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABIUTY
The analysis for determining whether the doctrine of unconscionability
supplements should not vary from that used for determining supplemen-
tation by other common law or equitable principles.1 9 Will the purposes
and policies of simplification, clarification, modernization, predictability,
and uniformity of commercial law be advanced through judicial scrutiny
of the bargaining process and the substantive fairness of the terms in the
context raised? 20 Are the policies and purposes of the relevant article
advanced or compromised through supplementation by the doctrine in
the specific context before the court? Rudbart v. North Jersey District
Water Supply Commission1 2l is an example of the determination of the
displacement of the doctrine. Here, holders of notes issued by a water
supply commission alleged that the publication notice of early redemp-
tion of the notes, consistent with the terms of the notes, was inadequate,
that the notes were contracts of adhesion, and that the notice term was
unconscionable. Scrutinizing the transaction for both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, the court considered the following factors
to reach its conclusion: the sophisticated and highly regulated industry in
which the transaction occurred; the policy goals of the industry; the need
for certainty of terms in the industry; the subject matter of the contract-
publicly traded securities rather than consumer necessities; the absence of
117. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (be-
ing remanded for evaluation of cross collateral provision-Article 9); Perdue v. Crocker
Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985) (imposing insufficient fund charges for customer over-
drawing checking account through agreement under Article 4). But see Beathard v. Chi-
cago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. I11. 1976) (considering the effect of
revocable letter of credit under equitable unconscionability without authority for equitable
unconscionability); Best v. United States Nat'l Bank of Or., 714 P.2d 1049 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) (holding the applicability of Section 2-302 is only applicable to transactions in goods
while applying Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 208 without mentioning Section
1-103).
118. Williams, 350 F.2d at 445; Perdue, 702 P.2d at 503.
119. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
120. Rudbart v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681 (N.J. 1992)
(considering custom, usage, and the agreement to determine whether the terms of negotia-
ble securities were unconscionable).
121. Id.
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superior bargaining power on the part of the issuer; the availability of
other investment opportunities-no absence of meaningful choice for the
investors; the fully open and competitive market; and the effects on the
industry if the notice provisions were unenforceable.
Concluding that enforcement of the terms would advance rather than
contravene well established and important public policies reflected in Ar-
ticle 8 of certainty and stability in the marketing of securities, the court
held the notice provision as agreed was enforceable. Here, judicial re-
view of the fairness of the notice term of negotiable securities would be
inconsistent with state and federal securities law. Thus, in a similar con-
text under the U.C.C., the underlying policies and purposes should be
held to have displaced the doctrine of unconscionability. 122
Likewise, in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Industries,123 the court
weighed two competing policy considerations under the notice require-
ments of U.C.C. Section 9-504, the desire to impede dishonest disposi-
tions and a reluctance to strangle honest transactions. The court also
considered the overriding goal of Article 9 of providing a simple, effi-
cient, and flexible tool to produce the maximum amount from the dispo-
sition of collateral. After weighing the goals and policies of the Article
and the relevant provision, the court determined that the senior secured
party's failure to disclose to a junior creditor the contract terms of the
sale of collateral was not unconscionable, especially given the creditor's
disruptive conduct in prior attempts to dispose of the collateral. Here,
the policy goals of Article 9 and the purpose of the notice provision dis-
placed any unfairness in the secured party's deviation from the strict no-
tice requirements. This case may also be viewed as an example of the
underlying policies and purposes creating an exception to the strict oper-
ation of the express requirements of a provision. In contrast to these
cases that reflect the displacement of the doctrine of unconscionability,
Williams v. Walker- Thomas124 and Perdue v. Crocker National Bank125
are examples where judicial scrutiny of the contractual relationship for
unconscionable terms warranted remand to the lower court for considera-
tion of the supplementation of the relevant article by the doctrine.
122. See also Beathard, 419 F. Supp. at 1133 (finding neither procedural nor substantive
unconscionability in the issuance of a revocable letter of credit in arm's length dealing
between the issuing bank and beneficiary who had the assistance of counsel); Siemens
Credit Corp. v. Marvik Colour, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a
waiver of warranties and the exclusion of consequential damages were not unconscionable
where the terms of the contract were actively negotiated in the course of buyer's business,
the terms were visible and understood, and did not violate public policy but were consis-
tent with those customary in the jurisdiction).
123. 280 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Pa. 1968), affd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
124. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (remanding for evaluation of cross collateral provi-
sion-Article 9).
125. 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985). See also Riggs Nat'l Bank of D.C. v. District of Colum-
bia, 581 A.2d 1229 (D.C. 1990) (subjecting account agreement with terms on the reverse
side authorizing service charges for low balance accounts to review for unconscionability).
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C. Is THE MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE STANDARD A SUFFICIENT
TOOL FOR POLICING ARTICLE 1 TERMS?
Despite its brevity, Article 1 is a source of vital terms for agreements
that fall within specific articles. These Article 1 terms include provisions
on choice of law, notice, reasonable time, and most importantly, the right
to vary any default rule or to define standards of conduct within the
U.C.C. by agreement. 126 These terms are enforceable to the extent that
they do not disclaim the obligation of good faith, diligence, reasonable-
ness or care imposed by the U.C.C.127 and are not manifestly
unreasonable.
Courts construing the "manifestly unreasonable" standard have sought
to determine if a term varied by the agreement or the operation of an
agreed term stripped one of the parties of a right or remedy that was
bargained for or a right, remedy, or protection granted by a default rule
or standard of the U.C.C. Described as a limitation on the right of parties
to anticipate and allocate business risks, the standard is "deferentially
appl[ied] to the contracts of ... sophisticated parties."'1 28 Thus, the pa-
rameter of the manifestly unreasonable standard is the agreement itself,
which includes by definition the relevant course of dealings, trade usage,
and course of performance of the parties.' 29
The court in Hart Engineering Co. v. FMC Corp.130 stated that the
manifestly unreasonable standard assumes the agreement falls within the
boundary set by oppressiveness and inequitable dealing,' 3' or within the
standards imposed by conscionable conduct and is hence not subject to
invalidation by the doctrine of unconscionability. The Hart court could
make this observation because the matter before it, a goods transaction,
was subject to the limitations of Section 2-302. Although a court may
consider many of the same factors, such as the language or terms of the
agreement, circumstances existing at the time of contracting, or the subse-
quent operation of the terms, in addressing both the manifestly unreason-
able standard or unconscionability, the scope of inquiry differs. The focus
of the manifestly unreasonableness test is the agreement; the doctrine of
unconscionability begins with the bargaining process.
An interesting pattern emerged from a review of some of the cases
where the "manifestly unreasonable" standard was discussed. When ad-
dressing issues arising in the sale or lease of goods, deference was given
to the agreements of the sophisticated parties unless the agreement or the
operation of an agreed term stripped one of the parties of a right or rem-
126. See supra note 114.
127. See id.
128. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 919 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1990) (Article 2) (address-
ing whether a force majeure clause that exempted non-performance for explosions within
or beyond the control of seller contravened U.C.C. Section 1-102(c) duty of good faith and
diligence).
129. Nat'l City Bank v. Plechaty Cos., 661 N.E.2d 227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
130. 593 F. Supp. 1471 (D. R.I. 1984).
131. Id. at 1480.
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edy that was bargained for, or was a right, remedy, or protection granted
by a default rule of the U.C.C.132 In Article 4 cases, involving an agree-
ment defining more specifically the customer's duty to give notice of un-
authorized drawer signatures or alterations of instruments with
reasonable promptness 133 or an agreement shortening the one-year pre-
clusion for providing notice of an unauthorized signature or alteration, 134
deference was given to the agreement of the parties despite the unequal
bargaining power. Here, the strong public policy of allocating to the cus-
tomer the duty to monitor her account as the least-cost-risk avoider justi-
fied the distinction. However, at least one court acknowledged that the
customer had not raised the issue of whether the agreement was an adhe-
132. See, e.g., Loucks v. New Holland Mfg., Inc., 1993 WL 152288 (Minn. App. 1993)
(memorandum opinion). Parties agreed to a one-year warranty for a combine purchased
by the buyer. Buyer asserted one-year warranty was manifestly unreasonable. Court held
that where the defect could be discovered through ordinary use of the goods, the one-year
term was not manifestly unreasonable. The court distinguished Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft,
672 F. Supp. 369 (D. Minn. 1987) (defect only discoverable in ice storm), and McCullough
v. General Motors Corp., 577 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (only discoverable in automo-
bile accident), where latent defects awaited discovery upon an unusual occurrence the
terms were manifestly unreasonable.
133. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (1999). Fundacion Museo De Arte Contemporaneo De Ca-
racas-Sofia Imber v. CBI-TDB Union Bancaire Privee, 996 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998),
affd, 160 F.3d 146 (2nd Cir. 1998). In Fundacion Museo, an account agreement imposed a
duty on customer to exercise reasonable care and promptness in examining statements of
account and to notify the bank promptly in writing of any discovery and in no event more
than fifteen calendar days, later modified to 30 days, from the time the statement and items
were first mailed or available to the customer. Customer notified the bank of an unautho-
rized signature in August after the item ($825,000) was mailed as part of the May state-
ment. The court held that the one-year default standard for determining whether a
customer's examination was reasonably prompt could be varied by agreement so long as
the agreed standard was not manifestly unreasonable. Given the unreliability of the Vene-
zuelan mail delivery system, the thirty days of mailing standard was not manifestly unrea-
sonable. See also Stowell v. Cloquet Co-op Credit Union, 557 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1997).
Depositor of credit union sought to recover $22,000 paid from his account on forged
checks. Depositor complained in December that he had not received his statement for
November. Bank sent a duplicate statement that was also intercepted by the wrongdoer.
Depositor continued to complain about the absence of his statements for eight months
until the vice president was contacted in August of the following year. The following
month, the forgery scheme was discovered when a creditor called concerning an NSF
check. The draft withdrawal agreement required depositor to examine monthly statements
and notify credit union of errors within twenty days, thereby defining the "reasonable
promptness" standard of Section 4-406(c). Reversing both the trial court and the court of
appeals, the court held 20 days was not manifestly unreasonable.
134. U.C.C. § 4-406(f) (1999); Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 579 N.W.2d
247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). Customer, personally and as personal representative of an es-
tate, sought to recover from bank for negligently paying forged checks drawn on both
accounts and for honoring forged handwritten requests for cashier's checks. Both account
agreements imposed a duty on customer to give notice of unauthorized signatures or alter-
ations within 14 days of receipt of the statement including the items. Customer failed to
meet the fourteen day requirement. Court concluded the variation of Section 4-406 one-
year preclusion to fourteen days was not manifestly unreasonable in view of the following
factors: (1) Code policy of the relevant section of requiring customers to be vigilant in
conducting and safeguarding their own affairs; (2) modifications approved by other juris-
dictions; (3) substantial weight to authority from other jurisdictions to implement Code
policy of uniformity; and (4) the underlying public policy justification for permitting reduc-
tion of the period to limit disputes in light of the millions of bank transactions that occur
daily.
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sion contract. Because the issue was not raised in the trial court, the
court did not address the issue.
In another matter, the court described the depositor and the circum-
stances surrounding the formation of the contractual relationship: "a so-
phisticated businessman ... read... [the account agreement], understood
its terms, and recognized that he had a responsibility to review his ac-
count statements and notify the Credit Union of any errors. ' 135 The facts
substantially replicate the assessment generally made under the procedu-
ral unconscionability prong, which includes the sophistication of the party
asserting the existence of an unconscionable term, the complexity of the
term, and the circumstances surrounding the party's assent to the terms.
The conclusion that the manifestly unreasonable standard begins with the
agreement and not the process giving rise to the agreement, is reinforced.
Likewise, it is apparent that the courts are not totally oblivious to the
process by which the agreement was created.
With Article 9, however, in at least one case the court uses language
that is highly suggestive of analysis under the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity in determining if a term, which operated as a waiver of notice provi-
sion, was manifestly unreasonable.136 Will the co-mingling of the two
standards-unconscionability and manifest unreasonableness-lead to in-
consistent results and a lack of uniformity? Regrettably, under the reign
of the common law, the absence of appropriate tools to adjust the equi-
ties between parties led to the use of "covert tools"'1 37 or judicial manipu-
lation of core concepts such as "adverse construction of the language of
the agreement, manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance, or by
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the domi-
nant purpose of the contract" to prevent injustice and unfairness because
of the mechanical operation of common law rules.138 Without articulated
guidelines, will the manifest unreasonableness standard become the 21st
century tool of manipulation to achieve fairness?
The manifestly unreasonable standard is of limited utility, addressing
the bargain and the expectations of the parties, and therefore, should be
one of several tools available to courts to police bargains. Agreements
resulting from oppressive conduct or unfair dealing, extending beyond set
135. Stowell, 557 N.W.2d at 569.
136. See Oxford Resources Corp v. Jenkins, 642 N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1996).
Mother signed as co-lessee for daughter's lease of a car. After daughter's default, lessor
sold the car without giving co-lessee notice of the sale then sued co-lessee for the defi-
ciency. Court held that the terms of the agreement granting lessor the right "to pursue any
other remedy the law allows" was "too subtle for the commercially uninitiated lessee to
understand" as a waiver of notice of sale and was an attempt to substitute a standard for
the notice requirement of Section 9-501(3) that was manifestly unreasonable.
137. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960).
138. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. Generally, courts did not inquire into the adequacy of con-
sideration to prevent unfairness when enforcement of an agreement was sought at law.
But see Luing v. Peterson, 143 Minn. 6, 172 N.W. 692 (Minn. 1919); State Finance Co. v.
Smith, 112 P.2d 901 (1941). However, gross inadequacy of consideration coupled with
other factors was employed to deny the grant of equitable relief. See, e.g., McKinnon v.
Benedict, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968); Ogle v. Wright, 2 S.E.2d 72 (1939).
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boundaries, and violating the public policy concern which the doctrine of
unconscionability was crafted to prevent, provide an opportunity for
courts to become creative in inventing tools to reinforce substantive lim-
its on contractual freedom. Courts and other legal professionals must
recognize that, despite the omission of a substantive provision addressing
unconscionability in the current draft of Revised Article 1, the doctrine
remains a viable tool for assessing Article 1 terms, as well as an agree-
ment subject to the provisions of the other articles.
Fear is perhaps the overriding justification for an objection to including
an articulated provision on the doctrine of unconscionability-fear of
frivolous defenses by parties who assumed or were allocated risks in an
arm's length transaction; fear that those who possessed sufficient bargain-
ing strength and meaningful alternatives to extract a better deal may later
cry "foul;" and fear of increased litigation. But would a reasonably ar-
ticulated standard for invalidating an agreement or term because of un-
conscionability minimize, rather than increase, the risk of frivolous
defenses? With an articulated standard and guidelines in the language of
the text and its comments, counselors are equipped to assess the good
faith basis for asserting the defense in order to meet the requisite ethical
standards imposed upon them as officers of the court and to avoid sanc-
tions. Thus, the risk of frivolous defense is shifted to the proponent of
the defense rather than the opposing party. Additionally, an articulated
standard provides notice to the commercial community of the established
parameters of acceptable conduct. The guesswork is eliminated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the current draft of Revised Article 1, courts are given guidance
on determining the extent of displacement of the principles of common
law and equity. If included in the promulgated version of Revised Article
1 as currently drafted, uniformity of reliance on supplementary law
should increase among the jurisdictions and, correspondingly, uniformity
of interpretation and uniformity of the development of the U.C.C. Fur-
ther, developing the theoretical and doctrinal bases for displacement
under Section 1-103 lessens the tension that appears to exist between cur-
rent Sections 1-102 and 1-103 as independent statutory directives of equal
weight and significance. Conflicting approaches to the relationship be-
tween the general principles of law and equity and the provisions of the
U.C.C. should be minimized.
As the process of revision draws to a close, the Revised Article 1 Draft-
ing Committee should evaluate the message, if any, being communicated
through its consideration and elimination of a provision on unconsciona-
bility. More importantly, clarifying the relationship between the mani-
festly unreasonable standard and the supplementary doctrine of
unconscionability might be wise. Clarity now will avoid needless confu-
sion, increased uncertainty, and nonuniformity of results in the future.
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